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I. INTRODUCTION
The Panama and Paradise Papers shocked the world by displaying the
extent to which tax avoidance and evasion were running amok. Estimates of tax
avoidance and evasion facilitated by tax havens and tax competition1 differ, but
most agree that tax avoidance and evasion are significant and are of the order of
1 Some scholars differentiate between "harmful" tax competition and tax competition more generally.
This distinction, however, strikes me as vague and subject to serious and unsolvable problems of moral
relativism. Thus, the distinction tends to obscure rather than to enlighten debate. See Michael
Littlewood, Tax Competition: Harmful to Whom?, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 411 (2004). As such, this Note
will employ the term tax competition in a broader sense, although this term will often refer to what some
consider to be "harmful" tax competition.
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tens of billions of U.S. dollars.2 But, the world has changed since then for both
corporate and individual taxpayers. Corporate income tax rates keep dropping,
with "business friendly" tax reforms sprouting everywhere, most prominently
through the passage of the Tax Cuts & Jobs Act ("TCJA") in the United States
in 2017.3 Emerging global information-sharing regimes like the OECD's
Common Reporting Standard ("CRS") are under implementation in Switzerland,
Panama, and Singapore. At the same time, global pressure against tax havens is
at all-time highs. The European Union is weaponizing its strong antitrust laws
and the state aid doctrine against members' aggressive tax practices. Moreover,
States seem to be cooperating on a global scale pursuant to the OECD's recent
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting ("BEPS") initiative. While international
taxation has been the subject of intense academic and policy examination,
scholars have ignored how these phenomena evidence a broad push towards
standardization taking place around the world.
This push has been fueled by the threat that tax havens-alongside tax
avoidance and evasion-and "harmful" tax competition pose to developed
countries' treasuries. In appealing to their "right to tax" or tax sovereignty,
developed countries have attempted to respond to these threats, often by taking
unilateral or multilateral action against tax havens.4 However, due to the trans-
substantive, conceptual importance of "sovereignty" to the international legal
order, measures to curb tax competition and to counter tax havens have sought
to redefine "tax sovereignty" in either narrow or functional terms. Bounding the
concept of "tax" sovereignty is not a sufficient solution, however;
standardization will also require tax havens and other States to accept new
intrusions in broad areas of traditional sovereign control-such as immigration,
privacy and equal protection, and criminal law.5 Whether they will do so is an
open question, yet is one that should be appropriately posed.
Another way to get past the sovereignty concerns with standardization
is to trumpet the large economic gains6 from increased tax revenues. Standard
economic theory would suggest that harmonization of the tax system should
provide States with the ability to counter tax havens and curb harmful tax
competition, therefore increasing the pie. While calls for a bigger pie can seem
attractive, States should interrogate how this pie will be divided by the new
See Thomas R. Torslov, Ludvig S. Wier & Gabriel Zucman, The Missing Profits of Nations 22 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24701, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24701 .pdf.
Act to Provide for Reconciliation Pursuant to Titles II and V of the Concurrent Resolution on the
Budget for Fiscal Year 2018 (Tax Cuts and Jobs Act), Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
4See infra Section II.A.
'See infra Part I.
6 use the language of "economic gains" as opposed to the more conventional language of "welfare
gains" by economists and welfarists, as their interchangeable use depends on significant and
controversial ethical premises. See generally WILFRED BECKERMAN, ECONOMICS AS APPLIED ETHICS
(2017). Moreover, even if one assumes that the welfarist project is correct in its main tenets, there are
situations in which welfare as ethically understood sharply diverges from economic welfare-as has
been forcefully argued by Happiness Economics. See, e.g., JOHN BRONSTEEN ET AL.,, HAPPINESS AND
THE LAW (2015); RICHARD LAYARD, HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE (2d ed. 2011); LAW
AND HAPPINESS (Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein eds., 2010).
[Vol. 45: 1
2020] Transcending "Tax" Sovereignty and Tax Standardization 193
standards and, perhaps more importantly, whether a bigger pie is indeed
attractive. As recent "worldwide" standardization in the field of information
exchange evidences, developing States should be skeptical of standardization's
benefits and should carefully evaluate the distributional consequences of (and
rationale behind) the chosen standard.
Finally, States should consider how, initial welfarist calculations aside,
the forces behind standardization, harmonization, and globalization can work to
frame and foreclose discourse and debate. As happened in the human rights and
international trade context, increased globalization of a uniform standard
rendered some previously cognizable claims, especially with regards to
normative questions of fairness and justice, unintelligible under the newly
adopted legal and normative standards. For taxation, this could mean embracing
current inequalities as justifiable under a "legitimate" standard.
Consequently, this Note's purpose is to investigate three questions: (1)
Is the "sovereignty" problem posed by tax standardization merely one about "tax
sovereignty"? (2) How should we assess the desirability of such a standard with
regards to distribution? (3) What might be lost through processes of
standardization and what do similar processes in other areas of the law teach us
about the effects of increased globalization?
This Note has three main contributions to the literature. First, this Note
makes an original theoretical contribution to the literature by paving the way on
several unexplored issues with tax standardization, bringing in helpful insights
from trade law, human rights law, and egalitarian thought. Second, by grouping
recent tax developments under the framework of "standardization," this Note
provides a useful conceptual framework for future research. Third, this Note
makes a descriptive contribution to the literature by analyzing recent
developments in the standardization of the tax law, such as information
exchange.
The discussion will proceed in four further Parts. Part 1 will explore
how the processes of standardization, harmonization, and globalization operate
at different levels (i.e., national, bilateral, regional, and global) with reference to
examples from contemporary taxation, and it will conclude by introducing
Professor Grewal's framework for understanding these processes. Then, this
Note will turn to the three questions posed by the developments in taxation
discussed in Part H1. In Part III, this Note will question the concept of "tax
sovereignty," and will show that tax standardization will implicate several areas
of law usually reserved for State sovereign control. Part IV will question the
logic of "economic gains" advanced in support of standardization by looking at
questions of distribution. This Note will briefly look into human rights and
international trade law, analyzing the way in which standardization has framed
these areas of the law. Further, it will interrogate what increased standardization
could mean for international tax in a world with vast economic inequality among
nations. The last Part will conclude this Note with some preliminary thoughts on
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how States should think about these questions and how we might want to engage
with and respond to these ongoing processes in international taxation.
Before proceeding, several caveats are in order. This Note should not be
taken as a wholesale criticism of globalization, economic integration, and the
internationalization of many areas of the law. The creation of the post-Second
World War global legal order has brought with it more stability, peace, and
economic prosperity than any prior order. 7 This Note does not contest that
overall claim, but it does argue for a reassessment of specific standardizing,
harmonizing, and globalizing processes in international tax, which are separable
from the overall internationalization project. Unlike other criticisms of processes
of globalization, no moral relativism or appeals to culture or communitarianism
are either intended or necessitated by the questions and arguments laid out here.
Third, this Note unqualifiedly takes the stance that, just as with any other policy,
international policies and arrangements are subject to concerns about equality
and fairness. Finally, this Note does not take sides on the sovereignty debate, and
is generally agnostic to political science and political philosophy debates
regarding the source or legitimacy of State sovereignty. Rather, for the purposes
of this Note, sovereignty will be assumed to have uncontroversial and traditional
contours, and to belong to the "State"8-however one might wish to define it.
II. STANDARDIZATION, HARMONIZATION, GLOBALIZATION, AND
NETWORK POWER
How are nations responding to the related phenomena of tax havens, tax
competition, and tax sovereignty? While the approaches to these issues have
been targeted at different levels-in my taxonomy: at the national, bilateral,
regional, and multilateral levels-the underlying dynamic in all of these efforts
has been the same. States, especially more developed States, are increasingly
trying to standardize, harmonize, and globalize international taxation. Section
II.A will first analyze how States are seeking to engage in standardization, by
looking at four examples of these attacks on tax havens. Then, Section II.B will
briefly highlight some of the important forces at work in standardization and
harmonization processes.
A. Responses to Tax Havens
1. The Domestic Approach: The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
'See generally OONA A. HATHAWAY & SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS (2017) (tracing the
development of our current global legal order).
' This should be fairly uncontroversial. Even those who identify sovereignty not with the government
but with its people should be comfortable with such a definition. See Robert Howse, Sovereignty, Lost
and Found, in REDEFINING SOVEREIGNTY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 61 (Wenhua Shan et al.
eds., 2008).
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Several nations have sought to address "harmful" tax competition and
the problems threatened by tax havens through domestic policies. A good (and
recent) example of this trend is the passage of the Tax Cuts & Jobs Act (TCJA)
by the United States in 2017,9 which sought to address the threats posed by
increased international tax competition and tax havens and "[to] mak[e] our
country more competitive with other nations."'
The TCJA dramatically lowered the corporate income tax rates to
twenty-one percent11 and overhauled major parts of the Internal Revenue Code,
dramatically changing the its international tax provisions. In doing so, it enacted
several policy changes meant to encourage tax competition and to counter tax
havens--deploying minimum taxes and lower rates as a way to encourage
uniform and global tax standards. While scholars have certainly stressed the
TCJA's "cooperative" policy choices,2 we should still recognize that large parts
of the Act were meant to increase-rather than decrease--competition, as
President Trump's speeches illustrate.
Cooperation is indeed hard to square with both the rhetoric, context, and
effects of the TCJA. The global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI) provisions
were meant to act as a "soak up" tax of sorts on a Controlled Foreign
Corporation's U.S. Shareholders paying low taxes in foreign jurisdictions.'3 In
this way, GILTI seeks to incentivize tax rate consistency: tax havens attempting
to attract mobile capital away from the United States and other countries will be
faced with a harsh truth-whatever they do not tax beneath 13.125%, the U.S.
will tax through GILTI. 14 As American businesses miss out on the advantages of
low tax rates in tax havens (as a result of the soak-up tax), one might predict that
tax havens would lose their appeal and would, after a while, converge on taxing
corporate income at the GILTI rate.15 Therefore, GILTI could be seen as
designed to incentivize a convergence to a global and uniform "minimum tax
rate" of 13.125%.16
Yet GILTI does not eliminate incentives to compete through low tax
rates. In fact, it just means that, to the extent that nations are to compete with the
United States, they will do so by setting their rates in the range of 13.125% (the
9 An Act to Provide for Reconciliation Pursuant to Titles II and V of the Concurrent Resolution on the
Budget for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
10 Donald Trump, Remarks in Indianapolis, Indiana, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 4 (Sept. 27, 2017).
"See 26 U.S.C. § 11(b) (2018).
12 Susan Morse, International Cooperation and the 2017 Tax Act, 128 YALE L.J. F. 362 (2018).
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/international-cooperation-and-the-2017-tax-act ( rguing that
provisions like GILTI provide incentives to cooperate).
'3 See 26 U.S.C. § 951A(a) (2018).
14 The United States effectively taxes this income at 10.5%. The 21% rate, see 26 U.S.C. § 1 l(b) (2018),
is multiplied by the GILTI inclusion percentage (50%), see 26 U.S.C. § 250(a)(1)(B)(2018) for an
effective rate of 10.5%. See also Morse, supra note 12, at 368-69 (calculating GILTI step by step).
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GILTI-incentivized rate) to 21% (the regular U.S. corporate rate),17 as not all
income is subject to special GILTI rates-for example, sales of goods by a U.S.
corporation in the United States. Furthermore, GILTI does not capture all foreign
income-rather it captures income on a formula based on a company's tangible
assets in a jurisdiction. As has been broadly acknowledged since the early days
of the law,18 this calculation opens the floodgates to gaming and might provide
perverse incentives to U.S. companies to relocate their depreciable tangible
assets abroad, leaving ways for other nations to compete.
19
Other international tax provisions, such as the base erosion and anti-
abuse tax (BEAT) 20 and the foreign derived intangible income (FDII),
21 were
also implemented as tools to combat the rising power of tax havens and the
increasing revenue losses due to tax competition. The BEAT is a minimum tax
that "penalizes excessive deductible payments, such as interest and royalties,
made by certain U.S. firms to related non-U.S. firms.' 22 While "facially neutral"
the BEAT "generally should operate as an anti-tax haven provision"23 reducing
countries' abilities to exploit their tax rates to attract mobile capital.
The FDII effectively reduces the corporate tax rate on exports to
13.125%.24 This change-although likely in violation of WTO anti-subsidy
rules25--would also effectively lower the tax rates that American corporations
face when earning income internationally from intangible assets. Consequently,
'7 The application of the FDII would obviously affect this competition.
18See generally, e.g., David Kamin et al., The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and
Glitches under the House and Senate Tax Bills, 103 MINN. L. REv. 1439 (describing incentive
challenges in the new tax law).
"9 Analogously to FDII, GILTI defines the eligibility of income by assuming that all income earned by a
corporation above a certain threshold-l 0% of tangible productive depreciable assets-is IP-related
income. While this formulaic approach to determining IP-related income has several advantages
(namely, administrability and simplicity), it can be manipulated through tax planning. GILTI is
calculated by looking at a company's "Deemed Intangible Income," which is in turn defined by its
"Deemed Tangible Income Return." Congress deemed that a corporation's "Deemed Tangible Income
Return" should be 10% of its Qualified Business Asset Investment (QBAI). QBAI is a measure of a
corporation's specified tangible property. In plain English, QBAI is calculated in terms of the tangible
and depreciable assets (such as machinery) that a company uses to produce its "tested income." See 26
U.S.C. § 951A (2018).
20 See 26 U.S.C. § 59A (2018).
2 See 26 U.S.C. § 250 (2018).
22 Morse, supra note 12, at 379.
21d. at 379-80.
24 FDII provides a 37.5% deduction on foreign derived intangible income from the standard corporate
income tax rate (21%), resulting in an effective 13.125% rate-at least until the phase-outs kick in. See
26 U.S.C. §250(a)(3) (2018); see also Morse, supra note 12, at 375-76 (describing the TCJA's tax rate
convergence dynamics).
25 See generally, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Does the United States Still Care About Complying with Its
WTO Obligations?, 9 COLtJM. J. TAX L. TAX MATTERS 12 (2018) (highlighting that the FDII is a direct
descendant of the BTA, which had been found to be in violation of the WTO rules, and questioning
whether the U.S. is committed to the WTO); Rebecca M. Kysar, Critiquing (and Repairing) the New
International Tax Regime, 128 YALE L.J.F. 339,352-54 (2018),
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/Kysar-su38oca6.pdf(conmenting on the legality of the FDH under
the WTO rules);.
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in theory, U.S. corporations would have a smaller economic incentive to move
their intellectual property to tax havens.
26
2. The Bilateral Approach: Switzerland & Bank Secrecy
States have also countered tax havens through bilateral actions: for
example, by establishing information exchange standards between two nations
to address bank secrecy issues. Bank secrecy originated in its modem equivalent
in Switzerland. As Ronen Palan'notes, Swiss banks had offered secrecy to the
French aristocracy in revolutionary times.27 However, in the 1920s, the Swiss
strengthened their privacy laws, making it a criminal offense to divulge a client's
personal information.28 While controversial from the beginning and seen as "a
direct act of aggression" by several countries (who sometimes even jailed the
owners of Swiss corporations),29 countries around the world followed the Swiss
lead and the practice took hold.
This longstanding practice has recently faced intense backlash,
especially from the United States and the EU. In 2009, the United States imposed
a $780 million fine on UBS as a result of the affaire Birkenfeld,3 ° where a former
UBS employee acted as a whistleblower and shed light on the Swiss banks'
questionable offerings to wealthy clients.31 Yet the crackdown on Swiss banks
resulted not only in huge fines, disclosure of account holders' information,32 and
deferred prosecution agreements33 -it even led to the bankruptcy of venerable
Swiss banks which had operated for several centuries.34 Switzerland agreed to
share information with the United States through a bilateral agreement under the
26 However, that the FDII does not apply to domestic income derived from intangible assets and that
system-design issues with GILTI still ensure that tax havens remain competitive vis-A-vis the United
States. See Rebecca M. Kysar, supra note 25 at 350-55.
27 Ronen Palan, Tax Havens and the Commercialization of State Sovereignty, 56 INT'L ORG. 151, 161
(2002).28Id. at 161-62.
29 Id. at 162.
'0 Matthew Beddingfield & Colleen Murphy, The UBS Whistle-Blower Who Won't Back Down,
BLOOMBERG: BNA (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.bna.com/ubs-whistleblower-wont-
n57982086148/[https://www.whistleblower.org/in-the-news/bloomberg-bna-the-ubs-whistle-blower-
who-wont-back-down].
"See UBS Enters into Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 18, 2009),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ubs-enters-deferred-prosecution-agreement.
32 Information for as many as 4450 account holders was disclosed for UBS alone. See Raphael Minder,
Pressure Mounts on Vaunted Secrecy of Switzerland's Banks, N.Y. TIMEs (May 24, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/24/business/global/swiss-banking-secrecy-under-pressure-from-
europe.html.
3See, e.g., UBS Enters into Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 31.
4 See, e.g., Nate Raymond & Lynnley Browning, Swiss Bank Wegelin to Close After Guilty Plea,
REUTERS (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-swissbank-wegelin-
idUSBRE90200020130104.
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Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act ("FATCA") in 2014,35 thereby changing
its policies on bank secrecy-at least in its relationships to U.S. citizens.
This bilateral agreement with the U.S. led to broader changes after
Switzerland was pressured by the EU. After strong-arming Austria and
Luxembourg into abandoning their secrecy rules, the EU came for Switzerland
in 2013.36 The pressure led to impressive results: Switzerland joined the OECD's
information exchange programs37 and began sharing information on Swiss
accounts with foreign jurisdictions in late 2018.38 These changes have led
commentators to pronounce Swiss bank secrecy dead,39 which if true, would
represent a significant shift from heterodoxy to orthodoxy for Swiss privacy
laws. These "nudges," mainly by the U.S. and the EU, illustrate not only how
powerful States can bilaterally ensure that their standards are observed by other
States (even if they have to do so through the threat of large fines and sanctions)
40
but also adumbrate how bilateral action can snowball into regional actions.
3. The Regional Approach: State Aid
States have also engaged in the fight against tax havens at the regional level,
usually by either pushing for a new uniform tax policy or punishing a State's
"deviant" policy. The EU's crackdown on Ireland and Luxembourg through
European Commission investigations pursuant to the rules on State Aid (and
these States' reactions to the crackdown), highlight regional European anti-
haven dynamics.
Article 107(1) of the TFEU prohibits EU members from providing
"illegitimate State Aid." The article reads
Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by
a Member State or through State resources in any form
whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by
favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain
3' Agreement between the United States ofAmerica and Switzerlandfor Cooperation to Facilitate the
Implementation ofFATCA, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY (Feb. 14,2013),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Dcuments/FATCA-Agreement-
Switzerland-2-14-2013.pdf.
36 Minder, supra note 32.
3 CRS by jurisdiction 2018, OECD (2018), http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/crs-
implementation-and-assistance/crs-by-jurisdiction/crs-by-jurisdiction-2018.htm (last visited Nov. 14,
2019).
" Michael Shields, Era of Bank Secrecy Ends as Swiss Start Sharing Account Data, REUTERS (Oct. 5,
2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-swiss-secrecy/era-of-bank-secrecy-ends-as-swiss-start-
sharing-account-data-idUSKCN IMF 130.
"9 See, e.g., Nicholas Hirst, The Painful Death of Banking Secrecy, POLITICO (Mar. 26, 2015),
https://www.politico.eu/article/the-painful-death-of-banking-secrecy; David Rogers, The Era of
Offshore Bank Secrecy Is Dead, FIN. POST (Jan. 28, 2015),
https://business.financialpost.com/opinion/the-era-of-offshore-bank-secrecy-is-dead.
0 I refer to the relationship between the EU and Switzerland as bilateral given the cohesiveness of EU
action on the matter and the fact that Switzerland is not part of the EU system.
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goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States,
be incompatible with the internal market.4'
State Aid jurisprudence has construed the article capaciously and has
narrowly read the express derogations of the principle contained in the TFEU.4 2
(As State Aid rules are part of the TFEU, national courts do not have the power
to construe State Aid's proper application.43) Generally, State Aid rules prohibit
States from using their tax systems to provide selective incentives to corporations
affecting competition or trade in the Union.
44
A key part of the State Aid doctrine, however, has been that only selective
State Aid-that which deviates from a general benchmark45-is forbidden.
Therefore, tax rulings given to singular companies are illegitimate State Aid, but
general "business-friendly" measures-such as low corporate income tax rates-
are not. In other words, Ireland's private tax rulings regarding Apple are illegal,46
but Ireland's favorable tax structure is not.47 While this distinction might not
seem very important from an economic perspective, its legal salience is derived
from the perceived "inviolability" of a State's sovereignty over the structure of
its domestic tax system.
The Commission's 1998 Notice evidences its compromise on the issue of
tax sovereignty-highlighting a State's ability to set its own "general tax
scheme" while rejecting a State's ability to create exceptions to that general
scheme.48 The Notice reads:
The main criterion in applying [Art 107(1) TFEU] to a tax
measure is therefore that the measure provides in favour of
41 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 107, May 9, 2008,
2008 O.J. (C 115) 47.
42 See CHRISTIANA HI PANAYI, ADVANCED ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN TAX LAW 238
(2015).
4' This is more complicated as a technical matter. See Id. at 244.
" See, e.g., Tax Rulings, EUR. COMM'N,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state aid/tax -rulings/index-en.html (last updated Sept. 25, 2019).
41 We should note here that, although the CJEU has recently seemed to conflate the "selectivity" and
"advantage" prongs of the State Aid tests, these are analytically distinct. This issue has been heavily
discussed by scholars and is outside of the scope of this essay. See Wolfgang Schdn, Tax Legislation
and the Notion of Fiscal Aid: A Review of 5 Years of European Jurisprudence, in STATE AID LAW AND
BUSINESS TAXATION 3, 8 (Isabelle Richelle et al. eds., 2016).
41 State Aid: Ireland Gave Illegal Tax Benefits to Apple Worth up to 613 Billion, EUR. COMM'N (Aug.
30, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-16-2923_en.htm; see also Commission Decision
2017/1283, On State aid SA.38373 (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) (ex 2014/CP) implemented by Ireland to
Apple,
2017 O.J. (L187) 1. (publishing the official decision of the European Commission).
4' As a general matter. Nonetheless, the EU has in the past addressed more structural fiscal issues of
member states. See CARLO PINTO, TAX COMPETITION AND EU LAW, 89-91 (2003) (recounting how
Ireland removed some direct tax incentives and changed some of its annual budget after pressure from
the EU).
41 Panayi, supra note 42, at 253 (quoting Commission Notice on the Application of the State Aid Rules to
Measures Relating to Direct Business Taxation, OJ C384 (1998)).
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certain undertakings in the Member State an exception to the
application of the tax system. The common system applicable
should thus first be determined. It must then be examined
whether the exception to the system or differentiations within
that system are justified 'by the nature of the general scheme'
of the tax scheme, that is to say, whether they derive directly
from the basic or guiding principles of the tax system in the
Member State concerned. If this is not the case, then State aid
is involved.4 9
This respect for a State's sovereignty over structural choices of their tax
code has allowed countries to compete for businesses without running afoul of
State Aid rules.
The Netherlands' proposed scrapping of its foreign dividend
withholding tax provides a perfect example of this competitive phenomenon. The
U.K.-based behemoth Unilever considered relocating to Rotterdam.50 As a way
of coaxing reluctant Unilever shareholders into backing the gargantuan
relocation, the Netherlands considered wide-ranging changes to its tax regime:
the country proposed scrapping its 15% withholding tax on dividends to foreign
shareholders.5' This proposal alleviated some shareholders' concerns, but failed
to convince a majority of Unilever's shareholders to back the relocation plan. A
couple of hours after Unilever decided not to leave the United Kingdom, the
Dutch prime minister tellingly indicated he was reconsidering the overhaul,
commenting that "[w]e didn't decide to scrap the dividend tax for just one
company, but the fact that such a large company that had decided to come to the
Netherlands has withdrawn its plan is very relevant.,52 Although this was his
official pronouncement, released documents have all but confirned the
transactional nature of this tax subsidy to Unilever.53 Although Unilever's
reversal saved Dutch taxpayers around $2.2 billion,54 the structural change
loophole to State Aid rules evidenced how tax sovereignty can shield States from
even the most stringent rules against tax competition.
49 id.
" Simon Jack, Unilever Scraps Dutch Relocation Plan, BBC (Oct. 5, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-45756738.
S The Prime Minister's true motivations were further cast into doubt by a document release regarding
his government's discussions with Unilever regarding the withholding tax. See, Toby Sterling, Dutch




"3 Linda A. Thompson, Netherlands Used Tax Break to Keep Shell, Unilever in Netherlands,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.bna.com/netherlands-used-tax-n57982091530.
"4 Joost Akkermans & Wout Vergawen, Dutch Drop Dividend Tax Plan After Unilever's U.K. Decision,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-15/dutch-drop-plan-
to-end-dividend-tax-after-unilever-u-k-decision.
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But, in recent years, facing a proliferation of tax rulings and "structural"
incentives, the Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU) have signaled a shift in their approach, partially abandoning tenets of the
1998 Notice and pushing towards regional standardization and harmonization.
In response to several States using.their tax code to attract capital and invoking
their national sovereignty to defend their practices from criticism,55 the
Commission has taken a stronger approach against tax competition, by seriously
questioning whether a State indeed has absolute control over its own "general"
tax structure.56
These recent positions suggest that the Commission is seeking to expand its
role in designing the EU tax landscape. In response to the Commission's
perceived penchant for prosecuting American corporations, the U.S. Treasury
Department argued that the Commission's Directorate-General for Competition
has expanded "beyond enforcement of competition and State aid law under the
TFEU into that of a supra-national tax authority that reviews Member State
transfer price determinations.' 57
In fact, the Commission has been exceedingly enthusiastic in finding
substantive benchmarks in OECD guidelines, rather than in national law, in order
to determine selectivity for State Aid purposes.58 In its filings against Fiat,
Starbucks, and Apple, the Commission suggested that even if a State's tax
incentives were non-selective with respect to the structural design of its domestic
tax system, a State might still have given a "selective advantage" in violation of
State Aid rules through a domestically legal, but inappropriate (in the eyes of the
Commission) application of a substantive "arm's-length principle."59 More
recent cases against European companies have also evidenced this approach by
the Commission.6° In light of these cases, Professor Panayi aptly notes
[W]hat is most disconcerting is that the Commission does not
actually satisfy .. the selectivity test. It fails to examine the
system of reference (ie [sic] the domestic transfer pricing rules)
.... Rather, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines seem to be
treated as part or akin to a national tax system, when in fact
5 As has long been the case with Ireland.
56 See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
7 The European Commission's Recent State Aid Investigations of Transfer Pricing Rulings, U.S. DEP'T
OF TREASURY 9 (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/treaties/Documents/White-Paper-State-Aid.pdf.
5'See Raymond Luja, State Aid Benchmarking and Tax Rulings: Can We Keep It Simple?, in STATE AID
LAW AND BUSINESS TAXATION 111, 117 (Isabelle Richelle et al. eds., 2016).
" Panayi, supra note 42, at 267-81 (emphasis added).
60 Oliver R. Hoor, INSIGHT- The Engie State Aid Decision-Another One Bites the Dust, BNA
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.bna.com/insight-engie-state-n57982094076/ (discussing the
Engie case).
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not all Member States had adopted or followed these
Guidelines.
61
Professor Mason has, in a similar vein, criticized the Commission's actions
in these investigations and has questioned the Commission's "sui generis arm's-
length standard.,
62
In other words, the EU has seemed to adopt substantive standards and
principles--e.g., an EU arm's length principle-which if derogated, would lead
to a finding of State Aid.63 If this is the direction of EU jurisprudence, member
states will cede their ability to fully determine their tax structure and would have
to comply with at least some basic EU principles, generally designed to combat
tax competition by tax havens.64 (While the Commission faced mixed success in
recent decisions by European courts, the courts have accepted the Commission's
role in defending the "arm's length principle.")65 Recent cases have, in fact, led
European scholars to advocate for an abandonment of previous State Aid
doctrine in favor of a more capacious and simple "non-discrimination"
analysis, 66 possibly setting the scene for even more structural standardization
across Europe.67
4. The Multilateral Approach: BEPS
States have also sought to use a multilateral approach to combat tax havens
through the creation and promulgation of uniform international standards of
taxation. The OECD's Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Initiative is the most
recent and high-profile example of such a move towards standardization. Pascal
Saint-Amans, the Director for the OECD Centre for Tax Policy and
Administration, described BEPS themes,
61 Panayi, supra note 42, at 277-78 (emphasis added).
62 Ruth Mason, State Aid Special Report -Part 6: Arm's Length on Appeal, 158 TAX NOTES 771,784
(2018)
63 Ruth Mason, Tax Rulings as State Aid- Part 4: Whose Arm 's-Length Standard? ,155 TAX NOTES
947, 954 (2017).
4 See, e.g., Rita Szudoczky, Double Taxation Relief Transfer Pricing Adjustments and State Aid Law:
Comments, in STATE AID LAW AND BUSINESS TAXATION 163, 176 (Isabelle Richelle et al. eds., 2016)
("The most controversial point of this reasoning is certainly the claim that a 'single tax' principle exists
above and beyond national tax laws which would not allow national tax legislators to derogate from
such principle.").
65 Ryan Finley, EU Court Overturns Starbucks Decision andAffirms Fiat, TAX NOTES (Sept. 25, 2019),
https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-internationa1/competition-and-state-aid/eu-court-overtums-
starbucks-state-aid-decision-affirms-fiat/2019/09/25/29z33.
6 Cf Sch6n, supra note 45, at 9-14.
67 Moreover, structural changes to the EU procedures allowing for a lower voting threshold when
passing taxation matters could foretell more action in the regional tax arena and further standardization.
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The BEPS package covers three unifying themes: to align rules
on taxation with the location of economic activity and value
creation; to improve coherence between domestic tax systems
and international rules; and to promote transparency. Like our
exchange of information standards, BEPS also provides
governments with practical measures and tools for
implementation, including model provisions for tax treaties and
domestic legislation, good practice templates and more.
68
If implemented, BEPS actions could, for example, reduce the ability of
taxpayers to exploit mismatches in domestic law to escape taxation altogether.
69
They could also reduce treaty abuse70 or create efficient and fast dispute
resolution mechanisms in tax matters.71 All of these actions would constrain a
State's powers to regulate its own tax matters, thereby reducing or eliminating
tax havens' ability to attract investment through certain schemes (and taxpayers'
ability to aggressively take advantage of structural differences and
discontinuities among domestic tax regimes). Yet, by harmonizing and
standardizing, some countries will be able to reduce friction costs and more
effectively address tax evasion, therefore likely producing aggregate economic
gains on a global scale.
B. Standards, Harmonization, and Globalization
States are increasingly reacting to the fiscal threat posed by tax havens. In
doing so, they are acting at the domestic, bilateral, regional, and multilateral
level. While some of these measures might be more effective than others--e.g.,
a multilateral solution over a loophole-laden domestic approach such as the
TCJA-all of these measures have one feature in common: they all seek to
harness the forces of standardization, harmonization, and globalization as
positive influences in curbing the power of tax havens.
In this way, nations are increasingly willing to abandon their laissez faire
attitude regarding a State's prerogative to independently structure their tax
systems. In doing so, nations are strongly pushing towards uniform models,
adopted by developed nations or enacted by international organizations steered
6 Pascal Saint-Amans, Global Tax and Transparency: We Have the Tools, Now We Must Make Them
Work, OECD OBSERVER (2016),
http://oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/5558/Global t x and transparency:_We have-the-tools
,now we must make them work.html.
69 See Neutralising the Effects of Branch Mismatch Arrangements, Action 2, OECD (2017),
https://read.oecd-ilibrary.orgtaation/neutralising-the-effects-of-branch-mismatch-arrangements-action-
2_9789264278790-en#page4 (describing Action 2 of the BEPS Project). But see, Reuven Avi-Yonah &
Haiyan Xu, Evaluating BEPS: A Reconsideration of the Benefits Principle and Proposalfor UN
Oversight, 6 HARV. Bus. L. REV. 185, 212-15 (2016) (noting the limitations of Action Item 2).
7 But see Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 69 (highlighting the BEPS' drawbacks).
7' See BEPSAction 14 Peer Review and Monitoring, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-
actions/action 14 (last visited Nov. 14, 2019). But see Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 69, at 232-33
(noting the limitations of Action Item 14, namely the lack of a framework for mandatory arbitration).
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by these nations, which other nations will have to adopt. Yet this movement-
towards the de-localization and "nudged" convergence of tax structures-is not
unprecedented in international law.
As Professor Grewal has argued in other areas of international law,
globalization has operated both by creating standards that incentivize large scale
cooperation (with snowballing benefits to increased standardization) and by
relatively disincentivizing alternatives.72 Perhaps unsurprisingly, "network
power"--the term Professor Grewal uses to describe the dynamic propelling
these two forces-does not operate uniformly or evenly: its operation is
influenced by power dynamics and asymmetries. Uniform standards "impose
their costs unevenly, and frequently privilege the already powerful. Therefore,
globalization may appear to many who feel its effects most acutely not as the
iron cage of modernity manifest on a newly global scale, but as foreign
imposition in the familiar mold of empire."
'7 3
III. THE SOVEREIGNTY PROBLEM & "TAX" SOVEREIGNTY
The literature on international tax competition, tax evasion, and tax havens
is plentiful and countries' policy responses to the problems caused by these
phenomena are varied. Notwithstanding this abundance, the literature is
unqualifiedly concerned with economic analysis and (classically utilitarian74)
welfare calculations, often ignoring-or at least repeatedly sidestepping-the
important formal and normative constraints and obstacles in the "fight against
international tax avoidance." These somewhat myopic discussions usually
address concerns about the loss of a thin conception of "tax sovereignty," while
ignoring the robust sovereignty principles that undergird international law and
will more broadly be implicated by current approaches to tax evasion. This Part
will first analyze how tax scholars and reformers have conceptualized the
problem of "tax sovereignty." The following three sections note instances-in
criminal, privacy and equal protection, and immigration law-in which proposed
tax reforms seriously intrude into traditional areas of exclusive State control,
challenging conventional notions of a narrow "tax" sovereignty.
A. The Problem of "Tax" Sovereignty
Scholars and practitioners have indeed recognized that some proposals
to curb harmful tax competition and to limit the proliferation of tax havens will
implicate matters of State's "tax" sovereignty. For example, the OECD paid lip
service to sovereignty by noting that its BEPS project was designed to "provide
governments with more efficient tools to ensure the effectiveness of their
" DAVID S. GREWAL, NETWORK POWER: THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF GLOBALIZATION 4 (2008).
7"Idat 8.
74 See BECKERMAN, supra note 6, at 63-76.
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sovereign tax policies. 75 In this vein, Allison Christians, notes that, in order to
defeat rampant tax evasion and avoidance and "[t]o regain effective autonomy
in tax policymaking, governments will have to end their deep-seated resistance
to multilateralism on grounds of sovereign entitlement.,76 Others, however,
rightly point to the uselessness and vagueness of the concept of "tax
sovereignty," correctly suggesting that adding "tax" to sovereignty obscures
more than it enlightens, given the breadth and interconnectedness of a State's tax
and other powers.77 However, these critics conclude that, instead of clarifying or
appropriately employing the concept, "international tax discourse would benefit
greatly if participants simply refrained from making sovereignty-based
assertions.78 These reactions are understandable as, after all, States often have
often mis- and overused the language of sovereignty to defend all sorts of
undesirable-and immoral-policies,7 9 including tax policies.
Regardless of the historical mis- or overuse of sovereignty language in
the context of tax, the current international legal order requires that any reforms
address the "problem of sovereignty." State consent is the main legitimizing
value of international law. Sources of international law-whether they be
treaties81 or customary international law--critically hinge on State consent. Any
cooperative framework or push towards standardization, then, would depend on
informed and uncoerced consent from States. Yet the relevance and value of
consent is derived from notions of sovereignty and political self-determination,
82
which theoretically undergird the current international egal system,83 even in its
7' OECD, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project: Explanatory Statement, OECD (2015),
www.oecd.org/tax/beps-explanatory-statement-2015.pdf (emphasis added).
76 Allison Christians, BEPS and the Power to Tax, in TAX SOVEREIGNTY IN THE BEPS ERA 4 (Sergio
Andrd Rocha & Allison Christians eds., 2017) [hereinafter Christians, BEPS].
77 Yariv Brauner, An Essay on BEPS, Sovereignty, and Taxation, in TAX SOVEREIGNTY IN THE BEPS
ERA 73, 75 (Sergio Andrd Rocha & Allison Christians eds., 2017).78 Id.
71 See W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84
AM. J. INT'L L. 866 (1990).
80 See Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax Competition, 89
GEO. L.J. 543, 597 (2000) ("Mandated tax uniformity (enforced by punitive sanctions, if available) is
generally regarded as an intolerable infringement on national sovereignty.... It is one thing to argue
that a country should be able to use the tools at its disposal-tools that impose costs on the local
population-to attract investment and tax revenues. It is another to attract investment (or launder the
profits generated by investment elsewhere) by using tools that impose costs only on outsiders (including
outside governments).").
" The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the authoritative international law source on treaties,
has no less than 55 references to "consent" in just 20 pages of text. See Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 332-351.
2 These concepts buttress one of the foundational documents of modern international law, the United
Nations Charter. U.N. Charter art. 2(1) ("The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign
equality of all its Members.") (emphasis added).
83 For an interesting tale of how the current international legal order came to be and of the changing
valence of the concept of sovereignty, see OONA A. HATHAWAY & SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, THE
INTERNATIONALISTS (2017).
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softest versions.84 So fundamental and established is sovereignty to our
international law85 that Hans Kelsen published an article titled "The Principle of
Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for International Organization."
86
Consequently, a plain rejection of the concept of sovereignty will just
not do. A reformer ought to engage with the concept of sovereignty. Scholars
and policymakers have thus sought to justify the increasing standardization,
harmonization, and globalization of taxation by (i) defining "tax sovereignty"
narrowly or functionally (i.e., a State enhances its sovereignty with increasing
revenues, despite more limited control over its tax system)87 or (ii) engaging in
welfarist appeals and claiming that standardization is necessary to solve a
harmful coordination problem.
88
The recognition that sovereign interests (even if they are called "tax"
sovereign interests) are involved in the push towards standardization, however,
has been notoriously devoid of the conscious acknowledgment hat the fight will
implicate much more than just "tax" sovereignty.89 A couple of recent examples
evidence that the effective fight against tax evasion will require a significant
intrusion into State sovereignty, a fact that States should consider before ceding
theirs. Addressing cooperation in tax matters will, for example, involve a
harmonization of everything from criminal law to privacy and immigration law.
B. Tax Sovereignty as Criminal Law?
Criminal law has entered the tax debate, as some States are pressuring
others to adopt wide (or any) definitions of the crime of tax evasion. Intervention
is warranted, States argue, as extradition requests are usually subject to a treaty
See John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 97 AM. J. INT'L
L. 782 (2003) (assessing absolutist notions of sovereignty critically but acknowledging the still-
fundamental role of sovereignty to the current international legal order).
8 See Samantha Besson, Sovereignty, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L LAW,
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10. 1093/law:epil/97801992316901aw-9780199231690-
el 472?prd=OPIL#1aw-9780199231690-e1472-div1-5 (last updated Apr. 2011) (providing a thorough
background on the concept of sovereignty in international law).
86 Hans Kelsen, The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for International Organization,
53 YALE L.J. 207, 214-15 (1944) (discussing the importance of sovereignty in the context of the creation
of the League of Nations and the beginning of a new world order).
87 Christians, BEPS, supra note 76, at 4 ("To regain effective autonomy in tax policymaking,
governments will have to end their deep-seated resistance to multilateralism on grounds of sovereign
entitlement.") (emphasis added).
88 See, e.g., Luis Eduardo Schoueri & Ricardo Andrd Galendi Junior, Justification and Implementation
of the International Allocation of Taxing Rights: Can We Take One Thing at a Time?, in TAX
SOVEREIGNTY IN THE BEPS ERA 47, 59-63 (Sergio Andrd Rocha & Allison Christians eds., 2017)
(explaining both rationales for standardization); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, All of a Piece
Throughout: The Four Ages of U.S. International Taxation, 25 VA. TAX REV. 313, 334 (2005) ("[The
Age of Cooperation (1989-)] is marked by a different response to globalization than unilateral
competition-acting in concert with our major trading partners to reduce both double taxation and
double nontaxation. Because the emphasis is on concerted action, this move promises a way out from
the need to balance U.S. international tax policy goals with competitiveness considerations.").
89 Brauner, supra note 78, at 75.
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requirement of "double criminality." 90 (This only applies to treaties in which tax
crimes are not explicitly carved out, as is often the case.91) As such, if a country
has not criminalized tax evasion, then extradition requests to that country would
be frustrated. Additionally, absent a bilateral Tax Information Exchange
Agreement (TIEA)-treaties on mutual cooperation, referred to as Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaties (MLAT), might require "double criminality" for the
exchange of information.92 Moreover, States might (rightfully) consider that
other States should criminalize tax fraud as a normative matter.
Therefore, it should come as no surprise that some countries with
"generous" tax regimes have used these formalisms to their advantage. Panama,
for example, was not a signatory to automatic exchange regimes like the
Common Reporting Standards until 2018. Panama did not criminalize tax
evasion until it was pressured to do so in February 2019.94 Moreover, even
Panama's MLAT with the U.S. had "double criminality" requirements-a rare
occurrence! 95 That means that until the date of criminalization, most tax evaders
would have been able to exploit the "double criminality" requirement to avoid
information exchange that would aid in their prosecution and would have been
ineligible for extradition even if they would have been successfully prosecuted.
Interestingly (and tellingly), Panama criminalized tax evasion less than two
months after the United States charged four men (two of them Panamanian) with
a slew of financial crimes-such as money laundering, wire fraud, and tax
evasion-in the aftermath of the Panama Papers exposd.96 International pressure
has forced other countries, like Andorra, to similarly enact laws criminalizing
tax evasion.97 While many, myself included, think that tax evasion should be a
crime, shouldn't societies be allowed to make their own determinations about
what is legal and what isn't (absent important claims about fundamental or
minority rights violations)?
o Bruce Zagaris, US. Efforts to Extradite Persons for Tax Offenses, 25 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 653, 654-655 (2003).
91 Id.
02 See Michael E. Tigar & Austin J. Doyle, Jr., International Exchange ofinformation in Criminal
Cases, in TRANSNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 61, 81 n.31 (1983); see also infra note
95 (showing that Panama's MLAT with the U.S. had a "double criminality" requirement). But see Sarah
Cortes, MIATJiu-Jitsu and Tor: Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties in Surveillance, 22 RiCH. J.L. &
TECH 2, 69-71 (2015) (noting how MLATs have recently lost their double criminality requirements).
" Panama Joins International Tax Co-Operation Efforts to End Bank Secrecy, OECD (Jan. 15, 2018),
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/panama-joins-international-tax-co-operation-efforts-to-end-bank-secrecy.htm.
9' Christopher Copper-Ind, Panama Outlaws Tax Evasion, as New Blacklisting Looms, INT'L
INVESTMENT (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.intemationalinvestment.net/news/4000914/panama-outlaws-
tax-evasion-blacklisting-looms.
95 Treaty with Panama on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, S. EXEC. DOc. NO. 104-3, art. 2, 6,
(May 5, 1995).
96 Doha Madani, 4 Men Charged with Fraud, Money Laundering in Connection to Panama Papers
Investigation, NBC NEWS (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/4-men-charged-
fraud-money-laundering-connection-panama-papers-investigation-n943 836.
97 Fiscal Paradise Lost: Andorra Criminalises Tax Evasion, FRANCE24 (July 17, 2017),
https://www.france24.com/en/20170717-fiscal-paradise-lost-andorra-criminalises-tax-evasion.
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C. Tax Sovereignty as Privacy and Equal-Protection Law?
The broad fight against tax havens has also involved difficult intrusions
into privacy and equal protection laws. An important and alluring aspect of tax
havens has been their secrecy and their tight control of information exchange.
The revelation of the extent to which secretive avoidance schemes flourished in
tax havens (e.g., the affaire Birkenfeld)98 led to massive policy changes, often
resulting in the repeal of banking secrecy laws or financial privacy rules, most
prominently in Switzerland.9
That being said, perhaps nowhere has the clash between information
exchange and fundamental constitutional protections been more evident than in
Canada.100 In 2014, Canada signed an agreement subjecting itself to information
exchange of bank account information)1 in order to avoid the imposition of
onerous withholding taxes under FATCA to noncomplying financial
institutions.102 While Canada is only one of many countries "nudged" into
signing these agreements,'0 3 the signing of the FATCA agreement has posed
unique questions under Canadian law.
After the signing of the agreement with the U.S., a Canadian group sued
their government, claiming that the agreement violated fundamental privacy
protections under Canadian law. The lawsuit alleges, inter alia, that the Canadian
parliament acted ultra vires in signing the FATCA agreement,'04 that the FATCA
agreement violates Canadian's constitutional rights to "liberty and security,"'
0 5
that the FATCA agreement violates Canadians' "reasonable expectation of
privacy in their [bank information],"'016 and more importantly, that it violates
equal protection by discriminating with regards to national origin and citizenship
(in the case of dual citizens).' 7 While a lower Canadian court dismissed the
action,10 8 the decision of Ontario's Federal Court is expected to be appealed.10 9
9 See supra Section H.A.
99 Id.
10 Some have (unsuccessfully) challenged information exchange treaties as unduly affecting analogous
individual rights. See Schoueri & Galendi Jinior, supra note 88 at 69
"' Agreement to Improve International Tax Compliance Through Enhanced Exchange of Information
Under the Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, U.S.-Can., Feb. 5, 2014,
T.I.A.S. No. 14-627.
102 See infra Section 1V.C (describing FATCA and IGAs in detail).
103 Id.
"o See Complaint at 13 65, Deegan v. Canada, [2019] F.C. 960 (Can. Ont. Fed. Ct.) No. T-1736-14,
http://files4.design-editor.com/41/410162fUploadedFiles/1 8a42fle-e327-4102-bb53-l2eOdbd2fa84.pdf.
l-
5 Id. at 13 69.
106 Id. at 13 70-72.
107 Id. at 14-15 73-77.
... Deegan v. Canada [2019] F.C. 960, 442 (Can. Ont. Fed. Ct.).109 ALLIANCE FOR THE DEFENCE OF CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY, http://www.adcs-adsc.ca (last visited
Nov. 14, 2019); Pedro Gongalves, Canadians Anti-FATCA Fight in Court Will Be Further Appealed,
INT'L INV. (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.intemationalinvestment.net/news/4000885/canadians-anti-
fatca-fight-court-appealed.
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While some might view these claims (perhaps rightly) as a typical
example of a cynical abuse-of-rights scenario, we should acknowledge that there
might be good reasons as to why a State might decide to have stricter privacy or
equal protection laws. For example, nations might ground these strict
constitutional protections on legitimate concerns for the safety of citizens' tax
records in foreign countries-let us remember how hackers stole information on
more than five million accounts from the Bulgarian tax authorities, including
information on foreign persons shared with Bulgaria by foreign governments."0
However, we should assume arguendo that the claims have some merit under
Canadian law, as at least a prominent Canadian constitutional scholar thinks they
do."' After all, constitutional protections vary widely from country to country,
often representing differing cultural values and concerns. Wouldn't changing the
contours of citizens' constitutional rights to benefit another country represent an
action in need of serious democratic justification?
D. Tax Sovereignty as Immigration Law?
Immigration law has also been an area of proposed reform and promises
to be another hotbed of tax avoidance and evasion. Around the world, countries
are increasingly using "golden passport" or "golden visa" schemes to attract
foreign investment and increase tax revenues 12 In these schemes, investors are
allowed to obtain citizenship or permanent residency after investing a certain
amount in a country.'13
Notwithstanding how common they are, the use of "golden visas" has
become increasingly controversial-especially in the EU, where Bulgaria,
Cyprus, and Malta operate such schemes. 114 A recent report by the EU decried
their use, warning that monitoring was necessary to ensure "that individuals do
not take advantage of these schemes to benefit from privileged tax rules."115 The
Commission elaborated: "a risk of potential aggressive tax planning and evasion
can be created when individuals partaking in the schemes are abruptly granted
new or additional citizenships which may help to obscure the actual tax residence
of the individual, leading to the tax rules in their original country to be
10 OECD Notes Hack of Bulgarian Revenue Agency Data, TAX NOTES (Aug. 30, 2019),
https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-international/common-reporting-standard-crs/oecd-notes-
hack-bulgarian-revenue-agency-data/2019/09/03/29wv1.
. Peter Hogg (a leading scholar and former Dean of Osgoode Hall Law School) argued that Canada's
agreement o comply with FATCA violated the equal protection guarantees of the Canadian
constitution. Letter from Peter W. Hogg to Department of Finance Canada (Dec. 12, 2012),
http://elizabethmaymp.ca/wp-content/uploads/peter-hoggfatca.pdf.
12 See Kim Gittleson, Where Is the Cheapest Place to Buy Citizenship?, BBC NEWS (Jun. 4, 2014),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-27674135.
113 See, e.g., Citizenship by Investment Malta, MALTA IMMUGR., http://www.maltaimmigration.com (last
visited Nov. 14, 2019) (providing a wide menu of citizen by investment options in Malta).
14 Commission Reports on the Risks of Investor Citizenship and Residence Schemes in the EU and
Outlines Steps to Address Them, EUR. COMM'N (Jan. 22, 2019), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-
19-526 en.htm.1 51d"
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circumvented."1 16 Additionally, "[s]chemes in countries which do not tax the
income, or tax it at a very low rate," the Commission warned, "carry a greater
risk of account holders hiding evidence of the real state of residence and thereby
evading tax."117 Responding to the report, a German member of the European
Parliament went further stating that "[g]olden visa and passport programmes
should be stopped immediately.... We need a European law to curb the sale of
European citizens' rights."
'1 18
The OECD has opposed these schemes, similarly warning that they
facilitate tax evasion. It has stressed that these immigration schemes might also
endanger its CRS protocol,119 because they might allow investors to opt out of
information-exchange by becoming citizens of countries with either non-existent
or minimal information exchange obligations or by selectively disclosing their
citizenship.120 In this fashion, individuals might be able to hide assets abroad,
escaping taxation. In response to this threat, the OECD published a "blacklist"
of twenty-one nations, seeking to shame jurisdictions away from their "golden
passport" schemes.1 2 1 Whether the blacklist will work is subject to debate, but
similar blacklists have brought about domestic law changes in other areas, such
as criminal law.122 Should immigration-a traditional area of exclusive State
control-be harmonized on a global scale without sufficient democratic debate
about the propriety of doing so?
E. Lessons on Sovereignty: No Such Thing as "Tax'" Sovereignty
However sympathetic (or more likely, unsympathetic123) these claims of
sovereignty might be,12 4 we should acknowledge the intrusiveness of incursion
into these areas of sovereign control. For example, determining who is and who
is not a citizen of a nation has remained one of the paradigmatic prerogatives of
16 Questions and Answers on the Report on Investor Citizenship and Residence Schemes in the
European Union, EUR. COMM'N (Jan. 22, 2019), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-19-
527 en.htm.
117 Id.
11' Citizenships and Visas: EU Commission Must Set and Comply With Binding Minimum Standards
Against the Sale Of Citizens'Rights, SvEN GIEGOLD (Jan. 23, 2019), https'J/sven-
giegold.de/citizenships-commission-standards/.
119 See infra Section IV.C for a discussion of FATCA and CRS.
120 Residence/Citizenship by Investment Schemes, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-
exchange/crs-implementation-and-assistance/residence-citizenship-by-investnent/ (last updated Nov.
20, 2018).
121 Id; see also Juliette Garside, Tax Evasion: Blacklist of2l Countries With 'Golden Passport' Schemes
Published, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/oct/16/tax-
evasion-oecd-blacklist-of-21 -countries-with-golden-passport-schemes-published.
122 As was the case with Panama and Andorra, see supra Section III.B.
123 For an example of a broader criticism of these types of sovereignty claims, see generally Reisman,
supra note 79.
124 See Ayelet Shachar, Citizenship for Sale?, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CITIZENSHIP 789 (Ayalat
Shachar et al. eds., 2017) (rehearsing arguments for and against the sale of citizenship).
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the modem State25-- even in the EU.126 If a State cannot decide who belongs in
its own community, then who can? A push towards non-recognition of the
State's citizenship decision-making would represent a strong rebuke to the usual
deference and comity other States award to these sorts of determinations. Apart
from obvious legal issues that would be implicated by non-recognition, non-
recognition would involve dangerous line-drawing exercises: why are Malta and
Dominica's golden passport schemes "dangerous," while similarly flexible
regimes in Austria127 and the United States 128 are deemed "acceptable?" Merely
pointing to the ability to "hide assets abroad" might not be enough-the United
States has strong financial secrecy laws and very minimal information exchange
frameworks that make it easy to "hide assets" from other jurisdictions in
American banks.1 29 Are these just games of politics based on reputation and
power?
Similarly, incursions into States' abilities to construe their citizens'
constitutional rights or to criminally proscribe certain behaviors should be seen
for what they are: serious concessions of State sovereignty in need of
justification. Clearly there are situations in which most would agree that States
are not and should not be free to use their sovereign power to regulate
domestically. In these cases, appeals to sovereignty ring hollow: for example,
125 Even a decision critical of the State's power to grant citizenship recognized that "[It is for every
sovereign State [] to settle by its own legislation the rules relating to the acquisition of its nationality,
and to confer that nationality by naturalization granted by its own organs in accordance with that
legislation .... This is implied in the wider concept that nationality is within the domestic jurisdiction of
the State." Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. 4, 20-21 (Apr. 6).
126 Though strongly critical of the Maltese "golden passport" scheme, Sergio Carrera acknowledges that,
From an EU law perspective, the case was a difficult one to argue. Questions related
to the acquisition and loss of nationality have remained in the ambit of Member
State's exclusive competence since the kick-off of EU citizenship in 1993 with the
entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty. One of the most sacred of cows in the
division of competences between the Member States and the EU is the entitlement
to control citizenship laws. No one can become a EU citizen without first passing
through the hands of a Member State. Since the introduction of EU citizenship, a
number of Member States have been exceedingly anxious to keep the EU out of
their citizenship laws and policies. Since then, citizenship has been something of a
'hands-off area for EU law.
Sergio Carrera, The Price ofEU Citizenship: The Maltese Citizenship-for-Sale Affair and the Principle of
Sincere Cooperation in Nationality Matters, 21 MAASTiCHT J. EUR. & COMP.L. 406, 407 (2014)
(footnote omitted); see also Case C-192/99, The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex
parte: Manjit Kaur, ECR 1-1237 (E.C.J.).
127 Sahel Zarinfard, Visa Scandals SlammedAustria's Door Shut - Or Did They?, OCCRP (Mar. 5,
2018), https://www.occrp.org/en/goldforvisas/visa-scandals-slammed-austrias-door-shut-or-did-they.
128 The U.S. has had a golden visa regime for decades. See EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program, U.S.
CMZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, https://www.uscis.gov/eb-5 (last visited Nov. 14, 2019).
'29 See Want to Stay Awayfrom CRS? Set up a Company in the USA, MEDIUM (Jan. 30, 2018),
https://medium.com/@icoservices/want-to-stay-away-from-crs-set-up-a.company-in-the-usa-
f7a383fa838; Craig Rose, Sticking Out like a Sore Thumb-The U.S., FA TCA and the CRS (Part 2),
BLOOMBERO: INT'L TAx BLOG (May 17, 2016) https://www.bna.com/sticking-sore-thumbthe-
b57982072499 [https://web.archive.org/web/20160828235708/https://www.bna.com/sticking-sore-
thumbthe-b57982072499/].
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most would agree that there is a strong reason to reject appeals to sovereignty
when faced with policies clearly in contravention of fundamental rights, such as
policies encouraging slavery or blatant discrimination on the basis of race,
gender, or sexual orientation.130 As such, this is not an appeal to moral relativism
or to an absolutist view of sovereignty. Rather, this Note seeks to acknowledge
that contravening one of the organizing principles of our Westphalian (or post-
Westphalian)131 world in the name of "standardization" requires serious
normative justification. So, is standardization worth the trouble?
IV. How WILL THE PIE BE DIVIDED? WHY?
Most agree that standardization in international tax should bring global
economic gains. Yet that is not and should not be the end of policy analysis. A
common-and legitimate-response to a structure designed to maximize
economic or welfare gains is to ask about distribution. In that vein, scholars
frequently ask: setting aside the size of the pie, how will it be distributed?132 This
strand of distributional questions has been common in policy analysis of all sorts,
especially in tax, where issues of horizontal and vertical equity are part of the
standard framework of policy analysis. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these questions
now abound in the literature critical of tax standardization.
This Note takes a different approach: it argues that in the face of large mutual
gains potentially achievable from standardization-which come at the expense
of significant intrusions into sovereignty at large, not just "tax" sovereignty"'-
developing countries should ask more questions than simply, "Will we divide
the bigger pie?" By referencing recent developments in information exchange,
this Note posits that developing countries will be well-served by further asking,
"Why should the bigger pie be distributed this way?"
A. Tax Rules as Distributional Rules
Any standardization of taxing rules (whether partial or complete), even
absent an explicit distribution mechanism like rate progressivity, will imply an
underlying allocation of tax revenue. For example, in the double-taxation treaty
(DTA) arena, even "wonky" clauses defining "permanent establishment" will
have the effect of divvying up taxing rights between source and residence
States-a more restrictive definition usually benefitting residence (and capital-
exporting) States. Differences in the definitions of permanent establishment can
13o Cf Reisman, supra note 79.
131 See Jackson, supra note 84, at 786-87. (recognizing that, although we seem to have transcended a
Westphalian understanding of sovereignty, sovereignty is still a foundational concept of our
international order).
132 But see MAARTEN FLORIS DE WILDE, SHARING THE PIE 719 (2017) (arguing that "fairness" in
taxation should be based on the "neutrality principle" and that fairness requires that "[t]he distribution of
production factors should take place on the basis of market mechanisms without-or at least with as
little as possible-public interference (economic efficiency)").
133 See supra Part In.
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thus be seen as directly carving out revenue and distributing it among States that
adopt the definitions. Current model tax treaties in the area of resource extraction
help elucidate how standards can have vastly different distributional
consequences: by some accounts, the (largely failed) U.N. Model gives resource-
rich source countries as much as twice the taxing power than they would receive
under the (unsurprisingly) less favorable OECD model.
134
Therefore, arriving at new tax standards will not only involve "wonky" and
technocratic details, it will involve questions of global tax revenue distributions
that should be seriously considered. Global standards will clearly have some
"winners" and "losers," as even small changes to definitions in DTAs can result
in significant changes in the distribution of taxing powers. Proponents of these
measures are quick to point that these new global standards promise to increase
the size of the pie by alleviating the revenue losses from some international tax
avoidance and evasion. Therefore, a new standard is likely to lead to a potential
Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks efficient solution.135 In such a scenario, every State could
be made better off through higher revenues. However, this promise is vague in
one important respect-will all States, especially developing States, actually be
better off?
B. A Further Question and a Conceptual Frame: G.A. Cohen 's
Criticism of Rawls
Distributional inquiries should not necessarily stop with an assurance that a
policy will be Pareto efficient. In other words, we should question the
distribution even if we are assured that the mutual gains will be distributed to
make everyone at least a little better off. Critics have raised these questions even
when the proposed structure has been specifically designed or tailored to
distribute some to the least well-off. G.A. Cohen's rejection of Rawls is
instructive on this point.
In his famous critique of Rawls, G.A. Cohen rejected the difference principle
(and more generally the moral case for mere Pareto improvements in unequal
societies) in part by arguing that inequality should not be tolerated merely
because the worse-off are "bought off" with residual scraps from the overall
gains brought by inequality, while the better-off keep a hefty portion of these
'
34
Luis M. Almeida & Perrine Toledano, Understanding How the Various Definitions ofPermanent
Establishment Can Limit the Taxation Ability of Resource-Rich Source Countries, COLUM. CTR. ON
SUSTAINABLE DEV. 9-12 (2018), http://ccsi.columbiaedu/files/2018/03/Optimizing-the-PE-clause-for-
resource-riche-source-state-CCSI-2018-2.pdf (noting that while the OECD has a "minimum period of
time of more than twelve months for a construction activity to constitute a P[ermanent Establishment],
the UN model reduces that period of time by half').
" Wilfred Beckerman masterfully defines these concepts through a philosophical lens, still carefully
respecting their technical complexity in economics. See BECKERMAN, supra note 6, at 63-76.
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gains.136 In other words, we should not be agnostic to how mutual gains are
distributed-even if a portion are distributed to the worse-off.
But this critique does not just strike at the actual distribution of the gains; it
more importantly interrogates the reason why, for example, in order to agree to
make the pie bigger, the already better off need to be bribed with a slice larger
than everybody else's. Sidgwick helpfully summarizes Cohen's rather complex
critique:
The argument is, I think, decisive from a political point of view,
as a defense of a social order that allows great inequalities in
the distribution of wealth for consumption [like Rawls']. [But]
... when we have decided that the toleration of luxury as a
social fact is indispensable to the full development of human
energy, the ethical question still remains for each individual,
whether it is indispensable for him; whether, in order to get
himself to do his duty, he requires to bribe himself by a larger
share of consumable wealth than falls to the common lot.
13 7
Therefore, not only should we question how the pie will be divided,'38 but
we should also problematize distributions which, under the guise of a Pareto
rationale, award a large portion of mutual gains to the already better-off,
searching for an ethical justification for a given distribution of mutual gains, even
if collectively beneficial. We should be especially searching of the question of
distribution insofar as the choice of an international tax design is not compelled
by science or by tax's telos; rather, as prominent scholars have argued, these
general tax designs are arbitrary.
1 39
C. Winners Win: CRS, FATCA, and Tax Information Exchange
Academics and policymakers have generally been in favor of broad
information exchange, optimistically calling for the creation of extensive "global
tax information networks"'140 and lauding tax transparency "activists. 41 But
136 Cohen's version of this argument is stronger, also criticizing the better-off citizens' desire for
incentives to benefit the worse-off. See G.A. COHEN, RESCUING JUSTICE AND EQUALITY 154-55 (2008).137 ALAN THOMAS, REPUBLIC OF EQUALS 69 (2017) (quoting HENRY SIDGWICK, PRACTICAL ETHICS
108-09 (1998)) (second alteration in original) (emphasis added).
13' This question has been the subject of continued philosophical and policy analyses, often centered
around questions of global justice. See, e.g., Laurens van Apeldoorn, BEPS, Tax Sovereignty and Global
Justice, 21 CRITICAL REV. INT'L SOC. & POL. PHIL. 478 (2018). However, the question of not only how
but why we should accept unequal distribution of taxing resources is often forgotten.
139 See Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income - Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and
Unsatisfactory Policy, 54 TAx L. REv. 261 (2001).
... Miranda Stewart, Global Tax Information Networks, in TAX, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 316 (Yariv
Brauner & Miranda Stewart eds. 2013).
... Allison Christians, Tax Activists and the Global Movement for Development Through Transparency,
in TAX, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 288 (Yariv Brauner & Miranda Stewart eds. 2013) [hereinafter,
Christians, Tax Activists].
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even academics skeptical of the general promise of standardization and
harmonization in taxation have a soft spot for information exchange. In an article
critical of countries' push towards "tax coordination or tax harmonization,"
142
Professor Roin advocates for the harmonization of tax information systems and
argues that "focusing reform efforts solely on informational cooperation rather
than tax rate harmonization has significant policy advantages."
'' 43
Yet developments in the information exchange arena show that settling
on international standards might have asymmetrical results. Increased scrutiny
of tax havens and tax evasion-accompanied by pressure by the public144-- led
to the push for information exchange measures. Enhanced transparency and
information exchange in tax matters were the focus of several high-level
meetings at the OECD and G-20.145 Swiss bank scandals, most prominently the
affaire Birkenfeld,146 provided the necessary political will for the passage of
FATCA.
In 2010, Congress passed FATCA,147 which (in a nutshell) imposes a
30% withholding tax on transactions by financial institution or "recalcitrant"
account holders who fail to report to the IRS (or to their domestic national
authorities) accounts owned by a U.S. citizen or whose beneficial owner is a U.S.
citizen.148 As such, while FATCA is designed as a withholding tax, in practice 
149
it operates as a requirement to disclose U.S. citizens' bank accounts abroad by
financial institutions.
The unilateral push by the U.S. to obtain taxpayer information was
followed with a multilateral push by the OECD for information exchange. The
OECD marshalled nations to adopt the Common Reporting Standards ("CRS")
framework.150 Like FATCA, the CRS framework requires nations to engage in
the automatic exchange of information ("AEOI") of foreign taxpayers with
accounts in their jurisdictions. By creating a networked AEOI, the CRS
framework promises to enable countries to track citizens and their assets abroad,
142 Roin, supra note 80, at 544.
141 Id. at 594 (emphasis added).
'" See generally Christians, Tax Activists, supra note 141 (commenting on the rise of transparency
activism and its success in pressuring governments to adopt more transparency measures more
generally).
145 See Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, FATCA Legislation andIts
Application at the International andEULevel, EUR. PARL. 10 (May 2018),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/604967/IPOLSTU(2018)604967 EN.pdf
146 See supra section I.A.2.
117 Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, § 501, 124 Stat. 71, 97 (2010).
141 William Byrnes & Robert J. Munro, Background and Current Status ofFATCA, in FATCA AND CRS
COMPLIANCE 1-4 (2019), https://www.americansabroad.org/media/files/files/8fl c0f32/SSRN-
id2926119.pdf.
14' As evidenced by legislators' comments during the passage of FATCA. See id. (quoting Senator Levin
on the passage of FATCA) Moreover, as has been widely noted, FATCA has fallen way behind JCT's
revenue projections, lagging behind FBAR fines. See id. Nonetheless, FATCA has been pretty
successful in making it harder for U.S. citizens to hide their cash abroad.
"' For a simple explanation of the different instruments in the framework, see infra note 151.
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potentially making tax evasion harder. More than 100 jurisdictions have signed
on to CRS,151 including nations previously considered to be some of the most
"secretive" jurisdictions--e.g., Panama and Switzerland-after strong "nudges"
from the EU152 and the European Commission.
153
The success of multilateral efforts at information exchange
notwithstanding, the United States "has said it will not sign the CRS; does not
fully reciprocate under the FATCA intergovernmental agreements, especially
when entities are involved; and has not ratified the Convention on Mutual
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters"'54-- despite strong pressure by parts
of the U.S. government1
55 and by other countries.
156
Why wouldn't the United States join such an initiative, after it got the
ball rolling on AEOI? 157 There are several possible answers. Some might point
to the compliance burden and high costs of joining such an initiative. Others
might point to the new administration's distaste for coordinated international
action. 158
151 See Automatic Exchange Portal, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/Ltax/automatic-exchange/intemational-
framework-for-the-ors (last visited Nov. 14, 2019).
112 See Robert Goulder, The Blacklist Game: Should the EU Label the United States a Tax Haven?, TAX
NOTES (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/worldwide-tax-daily/tax-havens/blacklist-game-
should-eu-label-united-states-tax-haven/2019/01/08/29119 (discussing the listing and quick subsequent
delisting of Panama in the EU's tax haven blacklist in 2018).
153 Copper-hId, supra note 94 (discussing Panama's criminalization of tax fraud, which would
significantly aid in the exchange of information, after the European Commission's decision to blacklist
Panama). But see Francesco Guarascio and Alastair Macdonald, EU States Block Blacklisting Saudi,
Panama Over Dirty Money, REUTERS (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-saudi-
moneylaundering/eu-states-block-blacklisting-saudi-panama-over-dirty-money-idUSKCN1QO15M
(commenting on how EU members blocked the EC's decision to blacklist Panama after "heavy
lobbying").
154 Bruce Zagaris, International Tax Enforcement Cooperation in the Trump Administration, TAx NOTES
(Sep. 19, 2018), https://www.taxnotes.com/worldwide-tax-daily/tax-reform/international-tax-
enforcement-cooperation-trump-administration/2018/09/19/28bx
0 ; see also Casey Michel, The U.S. is a
Good Place for Bad People to Stash Their Money, THE ATLANTIC (July 13, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/07/us-anonymous-shell-companies/531996
(detailing the extensive use of American shell companies by foreign criminals).
155 The Obama administration sought to gain Congress' approval for some reciprocity in AEOI under
some FATCA IGAs. However, Congress did not pass them. See Laurie Hatten Boyd, Are Problems
Looming for FATCA and the "'Reciprocal" IGA? TAX ADVISER (June 1, 2016),
https://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2016/jun/problems-looming-for-fatca-and-reciprocal-iga.htmil.
While the US reciprocates under some model IGA's, not all tax information is covered under these
IGAs and not all countries (especially developing countries) have the benefit of reciprocal IGAs.
'56 See Kirsten Hastings, 'Frustrated' EU Politicians Step Up Pressure on US over FATCA, INT'L
ADVISER (May 9, 2017), https://intemational-adviser.com/frustrated-eu-politicians-step-pressure-us-
fatca/.
157 See generally Noam Noked, Should the United States Adopt CRS?, MICH. L. REV. ONLINE (2019),
https://michiganlawreview.org/should-the-us-adopt-crs-2/ (discussing the U.S. Government
Accountability Office's report recommending against implantation of CRS, and arguing that important
considerations were left out of it).
158 See, e.g., HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2019)
(discussing the administration's distaste for the current international legal order and commenting on
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But, perhaps more cynically, we should consider the strategic benefits
of rejecting CRS while simultaneously enforcing a unilateral FATCA. By doing
so, the United States benefits from a structural information asymmetry: it obtains
information about U.S. citizens living abroad while retaining the information of
foreign taxpayers. Such an asymmetrical regime not only increases the rate of
tax evasion by non-U.S. citizens,159 but also incentivizes this behavior in the
U.S.160 In other words, the U.S. is effectively increasing the costs of evading
abroad, thereby becoming relatively attractive for investors with a taste for
secrecy. Such behavior has led commentators to hold that the "U.S. is becoming
the world's tax haven."'1 6 1 A recent bill passed by the House of Representatives
that would give the U.S. government the beneficial ownership information of
U.S. shell entities is a step towards more tax transparency; however, the bill's
political fate is uncertain and, even if passed, the bill would do nothing to resolve
the current asymmetry in information exchange.'62 Despite pressure from
Europe, the American unilateral approach doesn't seem to be changing: when
asked about the United States' approach to a unilateral FATCA and CRS, a high-
ranking Treasury Department official confirmed that the administration is taking
a bilateral approach.163 In other words, the few who are able to bargain for
information might get some--developing countries might just be out of luck.
D. Lessons for States: It's All About Distribution
Recent developments in tax information exchange reveal the current and
potential shortcomings of tax standardization, harmonization, and globalization.
While the narrative of mutual economic gains was often trumpeted to justify
standardization in tax information exchange,164 after some thought this claim
now rings mostly hollow. Developing countries are often left holding the bag,
incurring massive compliance costs to asymmetrically provide benefits to larger
and more developed economies. While CRS might bring with it some benefits to
non-tax haven developing countries net of the large compliance costs involved,
these benefits are dwarfed by the significant gains flowing to developed
transnational egal actors' efforts and strategies to curb the administration's efforts to subvert the
international legal order).
"9 Dhammika Dharmapala, Cross-Border Tax Evasion Under a Unilateral FATCA Regime, 141 J. PUB.
EcON. 29, 32-35 (2016) (crafting a theoretical model to show the tax evasion consequences of a
unilateral FATCA regime).
o See Michel, supra note 154.
161 Editorial Board, The US. Is Becoming the World's New Tax Haven, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 28, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-12-28/the-u-s-is-becoming-the-world-s-new-tax-
haven.
162 Corporate Transparency Act of 2019, H.R.2513, 116th Cong. (2019); see also Andrew Velarde &
Stephen K. Cooper, Combating Tax Evasion Central to U.S. Corporate Transparency Act, TAX NOTES
(Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-federal/transparency/combating-tax-evasion-
central-us-corporate-transparency-act/2019/11/04/2b36n.
163 Conversation with High-Ranking Treasury Official (Mar. 7, 2019) (conversation recording on file
with author).
164 Cf, Christians, Tax Activists, supra note 141 at 288 (describing global activists' calls to insert their
non-elite voices in tax policymaking to encourage more equitable global development, and noting the
immense challenges they face); Julie Roin, supra note 80, at 594 (questioning such reform proposals).
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economies.65 The distribution of the touted economic gains is telling. Why
should the costs be mostly borne by developing countries when the benefits
mostly flow to developed nations? Even if bureaucrats and econometricians were
able to prove that global information exchange (even an asymmetrical system)
is a Pareto efficient improvement desirable under a given social welfare function,
G.A. Cohen's prescient question still stands: in a society of nations with (at least
formally) equal legal and sovereign rights but vastly unequal economic positions,
what moral reasons can developed nations provide to receive a disproportionate
share of the gains derived from intrusions into the sovereignty of developing
countries? There seems to be a real difference between "might is right" and
"might ought to be right."
Yet this need not be afait accompli. In our current international legal
order, serious intrusions into the sovereign domain of States ought to be justified
normatively and legally, often by State consent. As Professor Grewal noted,
however, we should be especially skeptical of consent to standardization because
usually "convergence on a set of common global standards is driven by an
accretion of individual choices that can be considered both free and unftee,"
166
due to the strong network incentives toward standardization and disincentives
against alternative frameworks. While State consent might in fact be legitimately
procured with the alluring appeal of economic or welfare gains, States-
especially developing nations-should interrogate this vague language. In doing
so, States should shine light on the moral vacuity of terms such as Kaldor-Hicks
and Pareto efficiency,167 and further question why-in a vastly unequal
international system-the rich must be made richer for the poor to be made
somewhat less poor. States need not engage in a wholesale rejection of welfare
maximization, of Kaldor-Hicks and Pareto efficiency, or of Rawlsian ideals in
every arena or policy decision.168 Rather, what this criticism requires in the
165 This is the result of four factors. First, most developing countries are not capital exporters, reducing
the relevance of tax information of nationals operating abroad for purposes of residence taxation. See
Christians, BEPS, supra note 76, at 21-22. Second, the structure is designed to asymmetrically yield
information (e.g., unilateral information flow under FATCA). See infra Section IV.C. Third, the overall
incidence of tax avoidance and evasion targeted by these regimes is higher in developed countries. See
Thomas R. Torslov, et al., supra note 2, fig.7 (showing that the EU and the U.S. lose more than the
global average to tax profit shifting). Fourth, developing countries miss out on the benefits of attracting
capital through selective regimes, a privilege that only the U.S. (particularly Wyoming and Delaware)
will enjoy. See infra notes 182-186, and accompanying text.
16 GREWAL, supra note 72, at 5 (emphasis added).
167 See BECKERMAN, supra note 6, at 63-76 (discussing the ethical issues often ignored in the concepts of
Pareto optimality and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency); Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 195 (1999) (adumbrating problems with Pareto-superiority and
Kaldor-Hicks).
168 G.A. Cohen himself clarifies that there is no need for a wholesale rejection of these criteria. Instead,
we should recognize their lack of moral force and complement decision-making with considerations
about the distribution of net welfare gains. In his Tanner lectures, Cohen also clarifies the pragmatic
need to both criticize empty notions of Pareto improvements and embrace unjust but necessary policies.
He states that "[tihe policy of paying productive people plenty to get them to produce so that badly off
people will be better off is rational when productive people are resolved to serve only if they are richly
rewarded. But their stance is then unjust by the very standard which the difference principle itself sets.
Accordingly, on a strict view of Rawlsian justice, the difference principle in its lax interpretation, which
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taxation context is that the overall revenue gains obtained from tax policy
changes that require considerable sovereign concessions be distributed in ways
that significantly favor countries that need tax revenue the most--developing
countries.169 In policymaking terms, such a move would necessitate a serious
investigation of the social welfare function that policymakers talk about when
referring to "mutual gains."'1 70 The exact shape that a social welfare function
should be is both a contentious and technical subject and is therefore outside the
scope of this Note.171 Nonetheless, the previous discussion should help us at least
realize that traditional utilitarian and Rawlsian social welfare functions fail to
provide us with reasons to reject a Pareto-optimizing, yet still grossly unequal,
policy-for example, unidirectional tax information exchange frameworks.
In rejecting the moral force of appeals to some "efficiency" criterion without
additional ethical justifications, developing States might at least uncover the
motivations underlying some tax standardization policies, such as tax
information exchange.72 Although the realpolitik of international relations
might require developing States to concede part of their area of sovereign
decision-making and consent to policy changes that result in unfair bargains,
they should not agree without at least seeking to strengthen their bargaining
position by first seeking common ground and engaging in coordinated action
with similarly-situated States.173 Moreover, they should use the legal and
institutional tools at their disposal to promote tax standards resulting in a more
equitable, fair, and just distribution and reject appeals to mere efficiency.
Perhaps this is a fool's errand,174 but it's worth a try.
does mandate the incentives policy, is not a basic principle ofjustice but a principle for handling
people's injustice.... When there is no way to get [a kidnapped] child back without paying, when a just
outcome is not to be had, then paying, which makes all (kidnapper, parents, child) better off than
refusing to pay, is almost certainly preferable, although in some cases, with less at stake, we might
prefer to forgo the Pareto improvement, in order not to accede to an unjust demand." G.A. Cohen,
Incentives, Inequality, and Community, Address at Stanford University (May 21, 23, 1991), in 13 THE
TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 261, 326-27 (G.B. Peterson ed., 1992).
169 Figuring out how exactly to make these decisions is a complex task. For an interesting take spanning
philosophy and economics, see MARC FLEURBAEY, FAIRNESS, RESPONSIBILITY, AND WELFARE (2008).
17 See generally WILFRED BECKERMAN, supra note 6, at 57-61.
171 id.
172 See supra note 168.
173 Other scholars have recently called for such an arrangement; see, for example, Sergio Andr6 Rocha,
The Other Side of BEPS: "Imperial Taxation" and "International Tax Imperialism," in TAX
SOVEREIGNTY IN THE BEPS ERA 179, 196-200 (Sergio Andr6 Rocha & Allison Christians eds., 2017).
174 "The attempt by mostly developing countries to use the institutional framework of the WTO to take
back some of their lost (to the US) sovereignty in respect to intellectual property resulted in two weak
agreements, the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health and the pre-Cancun agreement on the
implementation of the Doha Declaration. While symbolically important as an acknowledgement that
WTO norms are revisable and not rigidly constitutional, these agreements have largely unaffected the
real-world ability of the U.S. and its major industrial interests to determine outcomes with respect to
intellectual property globally." Howse, supra note 8, at 71 (Wenhua Shan et al. eds., 2008).
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V. FRAMING AND FORECLOSING
Recent changes in tax law seek to set reference points and standards, and
once those have been established, other alternative standards, reference points,
or structures will be disfavored.175 In assessing standardization, therefore, we
should also assess the alternatives that are "traded-off," especially if they are
traded-off for frameworks buttressed on tax competition. While critiques on
cultural frames or cultural hegemony'76 should be familiar to scholars in certain
areas of international law, they have not significantly permeated tax discourse.
Two analogous areas of international law-human rights and trade-
experienced processes of globalization, standardization, and harmonization.
Recent developments and critiques in these areas provides warning signs for
advocates of tax standardization.
In the human rights arena, the creation of universal minimum standards has
resulted in incredible improvements around the world. 177 However, it has also
led to the foreclosure of serious debate about decolonization178 and economic
justice in international fora 79 and has transformed economic rights into
incognizable claims within the standard,180 as Professor Samuel Moyn has
extensively documented.
Similarly, while trade law's liberalization has arguably resulted in large
economic gains worldwide,181 network power and its epistemological framing
have transubstantiated "market openness" and "free trade" from instrumentally
valuable and negotiable goals into untouchable maxims. 182 This shift has shut
out policies that give special weight to social and normative concerns: for
example, sensible policies that strike a different balance between the poor's need
175 See supra Section II.A.
176 Some scholars' concerns regarding framing effects and discourse in different areas of international
law appear to be heavily indebted to the work of Antonio Gramsci. See generally ANTONIO GRAMSCI,
SELECTIONS FROM THE PRiSON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI (1971).
177 See WILLIAM F. SCHULTZ, IN OUR OWN BEST INTEREST: HOW DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS
BENEFITS US ALL 135-46 (2001); David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of
the Problem?, 15 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 101, 101 (2002); Hunjoon Kim & Kathryn Sikkink, Explaining
the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights Prosecutions for Transitional Countries, 54 INT'L STUD. Q. 939
(2010).
178 See MARK MAZOWER, No ENCHANTED PALACE: THE END OF EMPIRE AND THE IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 62-63 (2009) (highlighting how the creation of the United Nations
served anti-decolonization efforts).
179 See, e.g., SAMUEL MOYN, NOT ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTSIN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 5-6 (2018).
180 Id. at 146-72 (2018) (charting the broad ideological movement away from equality and towards
sufficiency); Id. at 182 (presenting an enlightening chart comparing the prevalence of human rights
books with books about socialism).
11 The distribution of these gains, however, is an important caveat.
182 MARC D. FROESE, SOVEREIGN RULES AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 65-66
(2018) (citing Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy-And Back Again: The Fate of the
Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 94, 98 (2002)).
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for affordable healthcare and intellectual property protections for medicines83-
policies that might result in economic losses but overall welfare gains.184
This Note does not claim that these epistemic framing effects necessarily
outweigh the benefits of standardization, which we should acknowledge are
significant (although some scholars might contest this premise).' 8 5 However, this
Note does claim that previous standardization, harmonization, and globalization
processes have brought about with them epistemic frameworks which often
foreclose important debates--especially ones that are essential for the needy and
the poor-because, as we have seen, standardization processes rarely operate
without reference to power asymmetries. 1
86
States should therefore seriously weigh the epistemological effects of
consenting to further tax standardization, especially considering the large
sovereign concessions this process requires and the uncertain and uneven
benefits standardization has produced in the past. Most importantly, States
should be wary of adopting uniform standards which implicitly (and sometimes
explicitly) legitimate tax competition as an acceptable or desirable buttress for
the international tax regime. In other words, States should ensure that measures
intended to counter what the OECD considers to be "harmful" tax competition-
for example, tax competition through the use of deliberately uncooperative tax
privacy mechanisms in "tax havens"187-- do not silence global concerns about
the fairness of the global tax system by merely relocating competition from one
policy or legal arena to the other (e.g., from tax law to trade law). States should
be wary of endorsing, for example, policy agendas that imply that harmonizing
tax privacy laws188 or outlawing "state aid" will fix the international tax system
and ameliorate the significant harms of tax competition. Such standardization
might be of some help to global treasuries, but it will certainly not address how
a global race-to-the-bottom on corporate tax rates to attract multinationals could
1.3 See Howse, supra note 8, at 75.,. But see Lee Branstetter, TPP and the Conflict over Drugs:
Incentives for Innovation Versus Access to Medicines, in ASSESSING THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP
20, 20-31 (Jeffrey J. Schott & Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs eds., 2016).
184 The growing field of happiness economics has underscored the importance of pursuing holistic policy
goals, especially by showing how in some situations more income is not welfare enhancing. See
BRONSTEEN ET AL., supra note 6;,; ERIC A. POSNER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN (EDS.), LAW AND HAPPINESS
(2010).
185 Cf. GREWAL, supra note 72.
186 See, e.g., supra Section IV.C; GREwAL, supra note 72, at 8 (noting that global standards "impose
their costs unevenly, and frequently privilege the already powerful. Therefore, globalization may appear
to many who feel its effects most acutely not as the iron cage of modernity manifest on a newly global
scale, but as foreign imposition in the familiar mold of empire.").
187 See supra Section ll.A.2.
188 See supra Section II.A.2; II.C.
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starve developing (and developed
189) countries of much-needed tax revenue.
t9 °
Reinforcing those narratives and policy agendas could induce policymakers to
fail to see the forest for the trees-as it has done in the context of trade and
human rights law.
Apart from these general concerns about tax competition, States should
evaluate the specific epistemic risks that adopting a specific proposal might
bring. Take, for example, Action 1 of the BEPS initiative.191 Action 1 seeks to
arrive to a global standard on how to tax the digital economy on a worldwide
basis. Several alternative designs for such a system exist'92: some adopt a
specific profit allocation rationale on a global basis (for example, the location of
users), others seek the application of a global minimum tax regime (drawing
inspiration from GILTI and the BEAT' 93). No specific tax design is pre-ordained
by science or logic194 and the morally arbitrary choice will designate how and to
which countries revenue should flow. For example, taxing digital services based
on where the users of the services are located-rather than where the company
providing the services is "physically present"-could help developing countries
like India to tax elusive profits to which these countries are not entitled to under
the hegemonic source and residence taxation principles.
195
States (especially developing States) should consider the degree to which,
by consenting to a specific standardizing tax initiative, they might foreclose
alternative pathways and cede their ability to make cognizable claims about what
legitimate domestic tax structures can be. In doing so, States are thereby all but
forbidding the adoption of alternative structures that might better fit the needs or
wants of their citizens. In other words, India should be wary of the OECD's
endorsement of a global minimum tax-because after an alternative standard has
89 See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the
Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (2000) (arguing that tax competition deprives both developed
and developing countries of revenue and forces reliance on less progressive forms of taxation).
1' See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, et al., Collecting the Rent: The Global Battle to Capture MNE Profits, 72
TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (noting how States are engaged in battles in multiple areas of the law
to capture MNE profits).
191 See supra Section II.A.4.
192 Stephanie Soong Johnston, OECD Sets Course Toward Global Digital Tax Deal by 2020 (Jun. 3,
2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/beps-expert/digital-economy/oecd-sets-course-toward-global-digital-
tax-deal-2020/2019/06/03/29kb 1.
193 See supra Section I.A. 1.
194 Some might argue that internal consistency or coherence with other principles of international tax
law (for example, source and residence taxation) will imply a set of given policy options. However, such
arguments seriously overestimate the degree to which tax law has an "internal logic." See Luis C.
Calderon Gomez, Is Tax Law, "Law? " Lon Fuller, Legality, and the Problem of Contemporary
Taxation (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Moreover, even assuming that the tax law has a
telos or internal logic does not mean that there is a "right" policy choice-a "consistency" or
"coherence" criterion could still be indeterminate as to a certain set of policy alternatives.
195 India has been at the forefront of conversations on the current tax principles' inadequacy in dealing
with the digital economy. See Committee on Taxation of E-Commerce, Proposalfor Equalization Levy
on Specified Transactions, GOV'T OF INDIA (Feb. 2016),
https://www.incometaxindia.gov.in/news/report-f-cmmittee-n-taxation-f-e-ommerce-feb-
2016.pdf.
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been chosen, a user-value tax could change from a practicable and legitimate
alternative that a sovereign state would be entitled to enact, to a deviant or
noncomplying tax structure clashing with settled OECD "best practices."19
6
We should bear in mind that standardization in international taxation can
happen fast. In the past, creating alternative arrangements post-standardization
has proven to be exceedingly difficult, even with the support of large
international organizations. Simply remember the failure of the UN 19 7 and
regional developing country groups198 to create effective tax treaty alternatives
to the OECD's model after it became hegemonic.199 Unsurprisingly, this OECD
model has proven highly beneficial to developed countries like the U.S. often at
the expense of developing countries' taxing rights.00
Additionally, these States should consider whether in embracing Action 1 of
the BEPS initiative they are legitimating tax competition and the language of
standardization, thereby closing the door to claims about global tax justice and
inequality. For example, it will be hard for countries like India to criticize the
injustice of distributing the lion's share of tax revenue from the digital economy
to developed countries once States have consented to an alternative standard.20 1
Just as claims of sufficiency framed out claims of fairness in human rights
law,20 2 wouldn't claims of compliance or non-compliance with a consented-to,
neutral, and uniform standard frame out discussions of global tax justice?203
VI. CONCLUSION
Tax standardization, harmonization, and globalization are coming.
Experiencing revenue shortfalls and facing domestic political backlash for
governments' lackadaisical responses to headline-grabbing tax scandals,
developed nations are pushing strongly against tax havens, "harmful" tax
competition, and tax avoidance and evasion. These policy responses have been
multifaceted (at the domestic, bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels) and
96 Contrast this with the harmonization efforts led by the European Commission against countries'
"interesting" takes on the arm's length principle. See supra Subsection II.A.3.
19' See, e.g., Philipp Genschel & Thomas Rixen, Settling and Unsettling the Transnational Legal Order
of International Taxation, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 154, 161 (2015).
198 Id. Several proposals for other model treaties by developing countries, especially in Latin America,
were abandoned after wealthy OECD nations refused to sign them in favor of the OECD model.
"' Pasquale Pistone, Geographical Boundaries of Tax Jurisdiction, Exclusive Allocation of Taxing
Powers in Tax Treaties and Good Tax Governance in Relations with Developing Countries, in TAX, LAW
AND DEVELOPMENT 267, 275-76 (Yariv Brauner & Miranda Stewart eds. 2013).
20 This point, however, is contentious. Compare id. (arguing the OECD standard usually benefits
developed nations at the expense of developing nations), with Rebecca M. Kysar, Unraveling the Tax
Treaty Minn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020).
http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/iles/upload- ocuments/Unraveling/o20the%2OTax%2OTreaty%2
0-%20Kysar 0.pdf (arguing that this is not the case).
201 Jim Stewart, User Value and Taxation of the Digital Economy, KLUWER INT'L TAX BLOG (May 9,
2019), http:/ikluwertaxblog.com/2019/05/09/user-value-and-taxation-of-the-digital-economy.
202 See Moyn, supra note 179, at 146-72.
203 Schoueri & Galendi Jinior, supra note 88, at 59-63.
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varied (domestic tax reform, bilateral treaties for information exchange, renewed
enforcement of anti-tax competition doctrines, and seeking the standardization
of several parts of the tax system). Nevertheless, these unique responses can all
be understood as part of a push to standardize, harmonize, and globalize the tax
system. As discussed previously, standardization processes both (i) coercively
assimilate through the increasing incentives from cooperation in an increasingly
larger network, and (ii) dis-incentivize alternative standards through epistemic
framings and increased costs of exit or divergence from the standard.
The standardization, harmonization, and globalization of tax law, however,
face the "sovereignty problem." In the Westphalian (or post-Westphalian) era,
204
the design and structure of domestic tax systems has traditionally been under the
almost exclusive control of the State. Therefore, any international law solution
to the coordination problems States face will require international action that
somehow intrudes into what has been traditionally regarded as the exclusive
dominion of the State. Reformers have thus sought to obtain State consent and
buy-in into their standardization agenda by arguing that (i) the intrusion into
sovereignty will be light; more often than not, by taking a narrow or functional
view of "tax sovereignty" and (ii) the intrusion is justified by the large economic
gains attainable by resolving this coordination problem. This Note takes aim at
these two arguments and posits three questions that the dense tax haven, tax
competition, and tax sovereignty literatures have been unable or unwilling to ask
given their relative disciplinary and methodological isolation.
First, in Part 11, this Note questions whether standardization advocates'
claims of light intrusions into States' "tax" sovereignty will indeed be light and
will indeed only intrude into a State's "tax" sovereignty. After considering three
separate areas of the law in which tax standardization is taking place-criminal
law, privacy and equal protection, and immigration law-this Note concludes
that reformers are vastly underestimating the breadth and depth of the necessary
concessions of sovereignty needed for effective and realistic tax standardization.
Given the breadth and depth of such concessions, States should (i) engage in
political consultations to ensure democratic consent for ceding broad sovereign
control and (ii) carefully size the gains of such standardization in deciding
whether the game is worth the candle.
Second, while questions of distribution are often repeated, their singular
focus on Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks criteria as "good enough" is unwarranted. If
reformers wish to trumpet the economic gains from increased standardization,
they should also discuss the distribution of the mutual gains of such
standardization. Tax design is not compelled either by logic or science -it is an
arbitrary policy choice. We live in a vastly unequal world, and costs will likely
be distributed unevenly amongst States. Therefore, why should the benefits of
tax standardization accrue mostly to already-wealthy States? Again, tax lacks an
internal telos or unifying moral architecture supporting it-choosing a legal
204 Take your pick, but this sovereignty analysis is still applicable. See Jackson, supra note 84.
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standard from a set of different possible standards is a question of practical
policymaking and is not necessitated by a universal logic or morality. That being
so, there is no going around the necessary ethical questions posed by a chosen
standard which results in a grossly unequal distribution. Standardization and
globalization of information exchange have in fact led to asymmetric costs and
vastly unequal benefits for nations. Consequently, developing States, which are
usually on the losing end of the equation, should set aside blanket appeals for
merely "efficient" or "mutually beneficial" policies, and instead ask how the
mutual benefit will be distributed and why. In practical terms, that means States
should seek to modify the policymaking criteria used to assess the effects of
standardization, and favor criteria which deal with the distribution of collective
gains more head-on. Finally, developing nations should seek to engage in
collective action if the distributional consequences of proposed standardization
policies are unjust and should engage in forceful moral appeals that highlight the
unfairness of standards that reinforce, maintain, and justify grossly unequal
distributions.
Third, States should also be wary of the framing effects of these processes.
Standardization, harmonization, and globalization often create reference points
and understandings of what is valuable and cognizable and what is not. Other
areas of international law which experienced analogous processes provide
helpful insights. In human rights, for example, the push towards universal
standards has indeed led to the improvement of the lives of many, but with it, it
has led to the establishment of "sufficiency" as the relevant criterion for human
worth, closing the door to legitimate claims about fairness and equality.
Moreover, in trade law, the increasing globalization and harmonization of
different trade systems has eroded the traditional compromise between "market
openness" and concerns about social welfare and its domestic regulation. These
processes, therefore, have effectively "framed out" valid and potentially welfare-
maximizing policies that seek to obtain a balance between, say, the poor's access
to medicine and orthodox views on the benefits of zealous IP protection.
This Note's three questions reveal that, although standardization portends
large gains and small losses, we should be more skeptical. While there might be
great potential gains from tax standardization, as embodied by the BEPS project
or by global information exchange frameworks like CRS, States (especially
developing States) should heed the lessons of previous standardization
processes, carefully analyze how and why tax revenue is being distributed among
States, engage in collective dialogue to find areas of common interest, and
carefully negotiate these policies, one by one. Maybe there is truth in the old
adage: the devil is in the details.
Or, instead of legitimating the current unfair regime through State consent
and cooperation, States could transcend potentially unproductive debates on the
importance of "tax" sovereignty or on the details of a specific tax standardization
proposal. States should rather question the overall structure and values of the
international tax system and address the coordination problem head-on. BEPS,
State Aid, FATCA, CRS, and the TCJA have all sought to change-and in doing
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so, standardize-the international tax system, seeking to reduce the harms of
"illegitimate" tax competition. Yet these policies exemplify contemporary
taxation's addiction to (and unnecessary legitimation of) tax competition more
broadly. Instead of seeking shallow cooperation through standardization (i.e.,
setting arbitrary limits on which kinds of competition are to be forbidden and
which are to be encouraged), we should perhaps strive for real cooperation in
comprehensive tax structures through which the harm of tax competition is
comprehensively addressed. For example, we might look at structures that
minimize the mobility of international profits by clearly and fairly delineating
who gets what; restrict the ability of States to compete in race-to-the-bottom tax
rate games; and allow for open debate over alternative types of structures and
substructures. (The OECD's recent discussions on a minimum global tax 6 la
GILTI and new allocation and nexus rules for global taxation of the digital
economy could be early but positive steps in this direction.)20 5 Perhaps while
these structures are agreed upon and tax competition is addressed we will be able
to more freely talk about claims of tax justice, rather than getting bogged down
with empty rhetoric on whether a given subsidy is "harmful" or a program
"legitimate" under an arbitrarily chosen standard. Perhaps at that time we will be
able to make the international tax system serve the needs of the State and the
needy, instead of an international tax system--standardized or not-that is
almost exclusively focused on a global economic rat race.
205 Stephanie Soong Johnston, Countries Cheer OECD 's Latest Corporate Tax Reform Proposal, TAX
NOTEs (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-international/digital-economy/countries-
cheer-oecds-latest-corporate-tax-reform-
proposal/2019/10/14/2blO7?highlight-oecd%20digital%20taxation.
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